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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present an objective evaluation model that can be applied on 
private Lebanese universities. A set of interrelated equations is established in order to reflect 
objectively the results of the faculty member’s performance evaluation. A simulation application is 
presented to illustrate the particularities of this model and its impact on the salary “pricing”.  
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
hile performance evaluation is not simple, faculty members’ evaluation is an opportunity to motivate 
effective job performance. It is a tool that can enhance the management of a University, and it is also 
a process that allows faculty members to be recognized for good performance and provided with 
recommendations for improvement. Since performance evaluation is communication between faculty member and 
University supervisors, it is an extremely important supervisory responsibility with far-reaching consequences for 
both the University eminence and the faculty member career. Thus, faculty member evaluation should lead to a 
certain form of promotion to be translated into a salary adjustment.  
 
However, Lebanese private universities suffer from a serious lack of objectivity in evaluating their faculty 
members’ performance or deciding about their salary increases. Hence, they require a consistent evaluation model 
far from subjectivity and prejudice.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to propose an objective and flexible performance evaluation model that can be 
tailored with respect to the budget constraints of each university and to its own evaluation criteria and norms. 
Consequently, the determination of the final salary will be automatically set and justified without biased individual 
interventions.   
 
2.0  The Model 
 
2.1.  Purpose Of The Model 
 
The purpose of this model is first to provide private Lebanese universities with an evaluation system that 
can be easily adapted and modified according to their evaluation standards and principles and secondly to assist the 
decision maker in adjusting and tweaking faculty members’ salaries.  
 
2.2.  Structure Of The Model 
 
Since the final endeavor of the model is to reorganize the salary in order to reflect objectively the results of 
any performance evaluation, we have built the final salary from four components/variables as follows: 
  
1. Basic Salary 
2. Transport expenses 
3. Personal points 
4. Seniority 
W 
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2.3.  Definition Of Variables 
 
2.3.1  Basic Salary, “Base” 
 
In order to determine the amount of Base, the model suggests the structure of a function represented by 5 
different factors. Factors can be considered as constant amounts or they can be allocated a certain weight to be 
considered with respect to the details and facts of each factor.  
 
The following table depicts the particularities of these factors:  
 
Structure of the Base 
 
#(2) 
 
W(3) 
Amount 
in $(4) 
1. Basis for starting salary BSS (1) 
  Constant 
K (1) 
2. Number of years of full-time teaching at the University level (TE) 
x y  =x*y*(1) 
3. Practical experience (PE), x y  =x*y*(1) 
4. Experience in Administrative Assignment (AA) x y  =x*y*(1) 
5. Research and Publications (RP)   =Sum(a:f) 
a. Reprint of Refereed Research Paper (RRR) x y  =x*y*(1) 
b. Refereeing of Research Papers (RRP) x y  =x*y*(1) 
c. Supervision of MS/MA thesis or Ph.D. dissertations (SD) x y  =x*y*(1) 
d. Textbook or Book Publications (TP) x y  =x*y*(1) 
e. Research activities (RA) such as conferences, seminars, exhibitions, 
publications of non-refereed papers and the like 
x y  =x*y*(1) 
f. Miscellaneous (M), professional recognition, Merit, awards, 
professional listings and the like 
x y  =x*y*(1) 
Total Base   Sum(1:5) 
 
 (1) BSS can be determined according to the country economic conditions regarding basic salaries, and to the 
university standards. The model proposes at the outset a clear definition of this factor, i.e., a starting 
amount should be set. This constant amount will serve as a starting point for the computation of the value 
of the four other variables.  
(2) # means number of years or number of research and publications. 
(3) W means the weight (in %) to be allocated for each variable. This weight is set according to the 
University’s strategy. The higher the weight, the higher the amount to be paid for the faculty member. With 
respect to the budget constraints of the university, the highest weight can be allocated for the most 
challenging variable, and the university can objectively, in this case, manipulate the ceiling and the floor of 
the Base. 
(4) The last column starting point 2 (i.e. TE) represents the result of the weighted number of years or 
publications times the constant amount already defined in (1).    
 
Consequently, the corresponding function can be written as follow
1
: 
 
Base = K + f(TE, PE, AA, RP)  (1) 
 
Where: 
 
TE = #TE*WTE*K  (2) 
PE= #PE*WPE*K 
AA= #AA*WAA*K  (3) 
RP= #RP*WRP*K = #RRR*WRRR*K + #RRp*WRRP*K + #SD*WSD*K +#TP*WTP*K+#RA*WRA*K + #M*WM*K (4) 
                                                          
1 For more details please refer to Excel sheet “Salary Simulation”.  
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The Base should be directly indexed to the CPI
2
, that is, at the end of the year, the cumulated average 
percentages of the CPI will be applied and added to the Base
3
.  
 
2.3.2.  Transport expenses 
 
At the end of 2002, a Lebanese National convention has set a daily transport expenses at US$ 4.6 or LBP 
7000. This sum should be an independent item from the other components.  
 
2.3.3.  Personal points, “PP” 
 
Personal points constitute the core of the faculty member performance evaluation.  According to our 
performance evaluation model, PP are divided into (1) points number and (2) points value in USD. 
 
(1)  Points number are a linear function of a set of variables to be defined by each university, such as:  
 
1. Competence: c,  
2. Skills: s,  
3. Experience: e,  
4. Publications: p,  
5. Academic activities: aa,  
6. Social achievements: sa,  
7. Integrity: i,  
8. Others (such as political sympathies, communal belongings, etc) 
 
It is worth mentioning that those variables are considered and counted one year after the faculty member 
has joined the private university. Therefore, there is no correlation between this function and function (1) defined 
above.  
Points Number =  (c, s, e, p, aa, sa, i).  (5) 
 
Where, 
 
Points Number = m1c + m2s + m3e + m4p + m5aa + m6sa + m7i (6) 
and m1, m2, …, m7 represent the corresponding elasticity to each variable.   
 
The weight of m1, m2, …, m7 can be determined by each university. However, and based on our survey covering a 
small sample chosen from the top 5 universities
4
 located in Lebanon, we propose the following weights.  
 
 
 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m
5
8 
Observation
6
 0.125 0.01 0.2 0.4 0.1 0 0.01 0.15 
Weight Proposition 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.1 0.1 0 
 
                                                          
2 Consumer Price Index. The selected CPI will be an average between the Lebanese Central Bank figures and the ones of the 
Administration Centrale de la Statistique.   
3 Inflation rates cannot be applied on the whole salary, it should only concern the first basic part since Base helps to 
cover basic needs (food, clothing, accommodation etc.) 
4 American University of Beirut (3 full-time faculty members), Université Saint Joseph (2 full-time faculty members), Notre 
Dame University (1 full-time faculty member), Lebanese American University (1 full-time faculty member), and Balamand 
University (1 full-time faculty member).  
5 m8 does not correspond to any variable defined in this study. It is considered as miscellaneous variable (such as special 
connections in the right places, political affairs, etc.)   
6 According to interviews done with full-time faculty members belonging to the above mentioned universities.  
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Values of m1 to m8 corresponding to our survey (observation line) are computed on the basis of a weighted 
average values. Our model weight proposition follows a normal and objective distribution taking into consideration 
the sociological and economic constraints of Lebanon as well as the academic quality equilibrium allocation.  
 
Each point number, i.e., c, s, e, p, aa, sa, and i will be by itself a function of a set of conditions, once 
realized, the full-time faculty member will be automatically credited with the corresponding points number. 
However, a ceiling of points should be set for each variable and this ceiling should be the same for all of them. In 
our model we propose a ceiling of 300
7
 points. This ceiling can be modified with respect to the internal strategy of 
the university.  
 
 
Variables Conditions
8
 Points number Weight 
Proposition 
Maximum Weighted
9
 
Points to be credited 
c  300 0.17 51 
s  300 0.13 39 
e  300 0.14 42 
p  300 0.22 66 
aa  300 0.14 42 
sa  300 0.1 30 
i  300 0.1 30 
 
The total weighted points to be credited is 300. This number is considered to be the maximum number that 
can be reached by any faculty member, with respect to the budget constraint of the concerned university. This 
budget constraint is based on the maximum additional sum of money that can be attained. Assuming a value of USD 
20 per point, the maximum additional amount cannot exceed in this case USD 6000
10
.   
 
Accordingly,  
PP = Σ (m1c + m2s + m3e + m4p + m5aa + m6sa + m7i)*Point Value  (7) 
 
The advantage of this model resides in the fact that performance evaluation can be measured personally by 
the faculty member and reflected objectively into his salary without ambiguity or individual favoritism. Therefore, 
any salary increase will depend on the achievement and effort deployed by the faculty member for the benefit of his 
or her university academic progress. Unfortunately, such an objective evaluation system is completely absent from 
the Lebanese universities programs.  
 
2.3.4  Link Between Points Number And Rank
11
 
 
The model has set a perfect positive correlation between the accumulated number of points and the 
promotion or the rank of the faculty member. The common factor between accumulated points and the rank is the 
300 number. This common point preserves the coherence and the consistency of this evaluation model.  
 
The greater the number of points accumulated by the faculty member during his/her career, the faster the 
promotion from a rank to another will be granted to him/her. The corresponding accumulated points number to each 
rank are proposed in the table below:  
                                                          
7 The selection of the number “300” has been set for an average and fair private university. 
8 The university can set the appropriate conditions to be fulfilled by the faculty member.  
9 The weight of each variable corresponds to the above values of the 7 parameters (m1, m2, m3, …, m7), i.e, 51 = 300*0.17 
10 This ceiling does not take into consideration other administrative responsibilities assumed by the faculty member such as the 
responsibility of being Dean, chairperson, etc. 
11 Rank is defined as the promotion from Instructor to Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and to 
Professor.   
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Rank Corresponding weighted 
points 
Accumulated weighted 
Points 
Instructor 25 25 
Lecturer 50 75 
Senior Lecturer 50 125 
Assistant Professor 50 175 
Associate Professor 50 225 
Professor 75 300 
Total 300  
The determination of these points is subject to the university discretion. However, the total number should 
always be in conformity with the above defined point number.  
 
2.3.5  Seniority, S 
 
The model suggests a certain compensation for seniority. This compensation should be independent from 
the promotion of the faculty member and at the same time directly correlated to the accumulated number of points 
calculated according to equation (6). In other terms, if the faculty member is still serving the university year after 
year but without any academic improvement, he will not be promoted but he will be compensated for his/her 
seniority with respect to his/her last accumulated points number. Consequently, this seniority is reflected in his/her 
salary via this equation: 
 
S= (PN, Y) (8) 
 
Where 
 
PN= m1c + m2s + m3e + m4p + m5aa + m6sa + m7i 
 
And 
 
Y= number of years*Value
12
 of each year expressed in USD 
 
3.0  Simulation (Please Refer To Excel Sheets) 
 
3.1  Hypothesis: 
 
1- Case of Dr. Happy 
Dr Happy is a full time faculty member since January 1999. 
He is very competent and devoted. He has published 3 articles in a refereed journal. 
He has 7 years of experience in Financial Institutions. 
He is very active and has contributed to the organization of 4 conferences within the University and he got an award 
in recognition of excellence in research.  
 
2- Case of Dr. Satisfied  
Dr. Satisfied is a full time faculty member since January 1999. 
He is a good teacher. He was not able to publish. His professional experience is limited. He is not very active.  
 
Question:  
With respect to the above faculty member evaluation modeling, what will be the annual salary of Mr. 
Happy and Mr. Satisfied at the end of 2002? (Make sure to present the salary structure according to its 4 
components).  
 
                                                          
12 Each university can attribute the corresponding value that can fit its budget constraint. 
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Assume an inflation rate of 5%, value per point = $10, value of a one-year seniority = 1 USD. 
 
3.2  Simulation results: 
 
 
Salary Distribution of Dr Happy (per month in USD) 2002 
Basic Salary 1,575.00 
Inflation amount 75.60 
Transport expenses 121.33 
Personal points 1,771.00 
Seniority 531.30 
Total Salary 4,074.23 
 
 
Dr. Happy’s PN 
Points Number (m1c + m2s + m3e + m4p + m5aa + m6sa + m7i) 
 
  m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 
Proposition 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.1 0.1 
        
 c s e p aa sa i 
 51 39 42 66 42 30 30 
        
Ceiling points number 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 
to be filled 200 150 200 180 150 150 200 
Weighted personal points 34 19.5 28 39.6 21 15 20 
Total personal points 177.1       
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Salary Distribution of Dr Satisfied (per month in USD) 2002 
Basic Salary 1,150.00 
Inflation amount 55.20 
Transport expenses 121.33 
Personal points 1,257.00 
Seniority 377.10 
Total Salary 2,960.63 
 
Dr Satisfied’s PN 
Points Number = (m1c + m2s + m3e + m4p + m5aa + m6sa + m7i)  
        
  m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 
Proposition 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.1 0.1 
        
 c s e p aa sa i 
 51 39 42 66 42 30 30 
        
Ceiling points number 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 
to be filled 200 150 100 100 80 50 200 
Weighted personal points 34 19.5 14 22 11.2 5 20 
Total personal points 125.7       
 
 
3.3  Simulation Summary 
With respect to the above simulation results, Dr. Happy should be promoted to the rank of Associate 
Professor while Dr. Satisfied should be demoted.  
 
4.0  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to present an objective evaluation model that can be applied on private 
Lebanese universities. This model has established a set of equations interrelated where the dependant variables were 
divided into four categories constituting the structure of the final salary and the independent variables were properly 
customized in way to fit each private university with respect to its endogenous and exogenous constraints. The 
particularity of this model resides in its flexibility in terms of “pricing” and in its objectivity in terms of performance 
evaluation (promotion, salary adjustment, etc). The main benefit of this model is that it avoids individual 
interventions during the evaluation process and reduces subjectivity to the bare minimum in a country where the 
promotion and the determination of salaries become subject to personal contacts and unprofessional assessment. 
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